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1 Introduction
The paradigm of considering some functions as
“random oracles” has been studied intensively, spe-
cially in the relative new field of provablc security.
This strategy provided cryptologists with a plenty
of proved “secure” schemes, even though the link
between the standard model, where the functions
are not random oracles, and the random oracle
model (ROM) is not yet fully understood.
For example, $[$6$]$ shows that there are schemes
that can be proved secure in the ROM, but when
the functions are concretely instantiated, i.e. not
random oracles, the resulted schemes are insecure.
Similar separations are known to exist even in other
models [1].
Some work has been done with respect to which
properties of the ROM are necesBary to obtain spe-
cific security properties for schemes, as discussed
in [2].
Despite of the criticism with respect to the mean-
ing in the real world of security proofs in the ROM,
it is known that this type of proof assures that the
scheme does not have design failures, i.e. easily ex-
ploitable structures.
The guarantee that the scheme does not con-
tain inner failurcs, compromising the security, is
the main motivation of pursuing such a proofs. Re-
garding this matter, for some proofs, it is necessary
to simulate the random oracle, in the sense of keep-
ing a table of input/output values of the random
oracle for the reductions in the proof, in order to,
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for example, simulate other oracles such as signing
and decryption oracles.
An algorithm that keeps such a table, automat-
ically receives two “powers”. The power of (1) $set-$
ting the output values and the power of (2) $watch-$
$ing$ the value of the queries. Our main motiva-
tion in this work is to study, by separating these
two powers, if there is a fundamental requirement
which is mandatory to achieve specific security
goals.
1.1 Our Contribution
Our work is based on encryption variants os
schemes with, namely, the variants of the RSA en-
cryption scheme which are secure in the sense of
Indistinguishability against Chosen-Plaintext
Attack (IND-CPA) and Indistinguishability against
Chosen-Ciphertext A ttack ( $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT} N$ D-CCA) respectively.
It is known that security proofs for these schemes
simulate the random oracle to the adversary per-
forming the attack. In some cases (not for these
variants), this may impose a restriction to prove
the security of some schemes.
We propose a different model with two extra
queries, named watching and setting queries. We
compare the wcll known security proofs for these
variants with suggested new reductions for the proofs
using our model. The suggested proofs show that
these queries (in fact, only one the watching query)
can be used in substitution to the random oracle
simulation in both cases.
1.2 Roadmap
We start by giving the definition of our model
and defining the notation of this work in Section 2.
The well known security proof of the variant of the
RSA encryption scheme for the IND-CPA and the
version of the proof using our model are presented
in Section 3. Analogously, Section 4 provides the
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version of security proof of the variant of the RSA
encryption scheme for the IND-CCA, both for our
model and for the one detailed in the literature,
i.e., with the simulation of the random oracle. Fi-
nally, Section 5 gives our analysis of the suggested
proofs and further comments.
2 Our Model
Let $S$ be some cryptographic scheme and $\mathcal{P}$ a
specific computational problem. Consider the set
$\mathcal{F}$ of all possible functions $h$ : $\{0,1\}^{n}\mapsto\{0,1\}^{1(n)}$
for some length function $l:N\mapsto N$ .
We define $\mathcal{P}$ as the problem of, given a public
key pk and the ciphertext $c$ , inverting the cipher-
text $c$ of the scheme $S$ into a plaintext $m$ , such
that, $S_{sk}(m)=c$ , for a secret key sk.
We continue our definitions with the parties in
our model.
Deflnition 1 (Adversary). An adversary is a
probabilistic polynomial-time Tlureng machine $\mathcal{A}^{O()}$
with random tape $\omega$ which interacts with $O$ by send-
ing queries $x_{i}$ of its choice and receiving $O(x_{i})$ .
We can also define the access of more than one
oracle, by writing $\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{1}(\cdot),\ldots O_{j}()}’$ .
Definition 2 (Random Oracle). The random
oracle $\mathcal{H}$ receives a regular query on value $r\in$
$\{0,1\}^{n}$ and outputs $h(r)\in\{0,1\}^{l(n)}$ , for $h$ uni-
fomly chosen at random from $\mathcal{F}$ .
We remark that any function $h(\cdot)$ can be viewed
as a table that maps the input value $x\in\{0,1\}^{n}$
to some value $h(x)\in\{0,1\}^{l(n)}$ . In addition, some
proofs use this strategy of keeping a table $T=$
$\{(\cdot,$ $\cdot)\}$ to simulate $\mathcal{H}$ by managing this table “on
the fly.”
For some security proofs, we employ reductions
which we model as probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithms $\mathcal{R}$ with random tape $\omega$ , and depending
on the scenario, they may access the random oracle
$\mathcal{H}$ through queries, and also use the adversary $\mathcal{A}$
to solve an instance of the problem $\mathcal{P}$ .
The difference from the well known security proofs
using reductions (and simulation of $\mathcal{H}$) is that, in
our model, the reduction algorithm $\mathcal{R}$ does not
manage the table of the random oracle $\mathcal{H}$ . Instead,
the reduction algorithm $\mathcal{R}$ can only access the or-
acle through queries in a black box fashion.
In addition, queries are known only by the two
parties. It means, for example, that the reduction
algorithm $\mathcal{R}$ does not know any query between the
adversary and the oracle, and not even know that
a specffic query was asked.
2.1 The Suggested Queries
Very often, the simulation of the random oracle
provided by the proofs means to manage “on the
fly” a table of queries made by the adversary and
the respective random output value. This strategy
gives, basically, two types of power to the reduc-
tion algorithm. They are (1) the power of watching
the query and (2) the power of setting the output
value of the query.
The motivation here is to investigate what are
the fundamental requirements to specific security
propertics, later we see that indistinguishability,
for example, can be achieved by using only one of
these suggested queries.
Our idea is to break these two powers into the
following two special queries, which are done by
the algorithm $\mathcal{R}$ to the random oracle $\mathcal{H}$ .
Deflnition 3 (Setting Query of the Random
Oracle $\mathcal{H}_{S\mathcal{Q}}$ ). The oracle $\mathcal{H}_{S\mathcal{Q}}$ receives the setting
query $(S\mathcal{Q})((M_{1} (.), y_{1}), (M_{2}(.), y_{2}), \ldots, (M_{t}(\cdot), y_{t}))$ ,
where
$y_{i}\in\{0,1\}^{l(n)}$ and $M_{i}$ are deterministic algorethms
that receive a parameter $r_{i}$ and output 1 or $0$ . The
first $t$ regular quer es will be answered using the set
values $y_{t}$ ($i.e.$ , by setting $h(r_{i})arrow y_{i}$), where $i\leq t$
regardless the values for $r_{i}$ , whenever $M_{i}(r_{i})$ out-
puts 1. Othemrise ($i.e$ . $M_{i}$ outputs $0$), $y_{i}$ is chosen
uniformly at random. The oracle retums a t-length
strnng of $0$ ’s and $1’ s$ , where 1, in the position $i$ ,
means that the value $y_{i}$ was accepted and $0$ means
otherwise.
In the cases, for example, that the specified $y_{i}$
has been already delivered, then $\mathcal{H}_{SQ}$ cannot change
its table, consequently it does not accept the set-
ting for such a value $y_{i}$ .
Deflnition 4 (Watching Query of the Ran-
dom Oracle $\mathcal{H}_{wQ}$ ). The reduction algorithm $\mathcal{R}$
asks the random oracle $\mathcal{H}_{\mathcal{W}Q}$ the watching query
(VVQ), which requests the parameter $i$ , and re-
ceives the pair $(r_{t}, y_{t})(i.e., \mathcal{H}_{\mathcal{W}Q}(i)=(r_{i},y_{i}))$,
$i\leq q_{h}$ , or the symbol $\perp when$ $i>q_{h}$ . The values
$(r_{i}, y_{i})$ are those kept by the oracle on its table at
the point of the query.
Here, $q_{h}$ means the upper bound in the number
of hash queries received by $\mathcal{H}_{\mathcal{W}Q}$ .
In later sections, we shall use the notations $\mathcal{H}_{\mathcal{W}\mathcal{Q}}$
$(\mathcal{H}_{SQ})$ or even $\mathcal{H}_{\mathcal{W}\mathcal{Q},SQ}$ to denote the random
oracle $\mathcal{H}$ that answers watching queries (setting
queries) or both watching and setting queries, re-
spectively.
Regarding the non-programmable ROM suggested
by Nielsen in [4], that author intended to capture
the ROM without the programmability in the UC
framework.
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In our case, the $\mathcal{H}_{\mathcal{W}\mathcal{Q}}$ is similar to that model
in the sense that we also intend to remove the
programmability of the random oracle. However,
while his model is defined in the UC framework,
ours is not.
We believe our model $(i.e,\mathcal{H}_{\mathcal{W}Q})$ can be extended
to capture other properties, e.g., the ROM with
setting query $(i.e,\mathcal{H}_{\mathcal{W}Q,SQ})$ , and applicable to the
analysis of security proofs in the ROM.
3 Proofs for CPA-secure RSA
Scheme
For this section and the next, we use a specific
cryptographic assumption, namely, we rely on the
RSA assumption, which says that any probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ ,
$Pr[GEN(1^{n})=(N, e, d)$ ; $c=m^{d}mod N$
$:$ $B((N, e), c)=m]\leq negl(n)$
for uniformly random choices of $m$ and random
tapes of $B$ and of the proper generation algorithm
GEN. For this case, it is said that the RSA problem
is hard w.r. $t$ . the GEN algorithm.
Let the scheme $S$ be the CPA secure variant of
RSA encryption scheme. Namely, $S=(G$EN, EN $C$ ,
DEC), for GEN $(1^{n})=(N, e, d)$ . The encryption al-
gorithm ENC$(N, e, m)=(r^{e}mod N,\mathcal{H}(r)\oplus m)$
for a randomness $rarrow \mathbb{Z}_{N}^{*}$ and a message
$m\in\{0,1\}^{l(n)}$ . The decryption algorithm DEC $(N,$ $d$ ,
$(C_{1}{}_{\rangle}C_{2}))=m$ computes $r=c_{1}^{d}mod N$ and
$m=\mathcal{H}(r)\oplus c_{2}$ for a ciphertext $(c_{1}, c_{2})$ .
First, we review the well known security proof
for the scheme $S$ . Then, in the second part of the
section, we apply our model and rewrite the secu-
rity proof.
3.1 The Well Known IND-CPA Security
Proof [5]
Let $Exp_{\mathcal{A}}^{CPA}(n)$ be the experiment wherc the ad-
versary $A$ , after receiving a public key $(N, e)$ , chooses
two messages $m_{0}$ and $m_{1}$ and receives a ciphertext
$(r^{e}mod N, \mathcal{H}(r)\oplus m_{b})$ , where $barrow\{0,1\}$ and $rarrow$
$\mathbb{Z}_{N}^{l}$ are uniformly chosen at random by $Exp_{A}^{CPA}(n)$ .
The experiment outputs 1, if $\mathcal{A}$ succeeds in guess-
ing the correspondent plaintext among the two
choices. Otherwise, it outputs $0$ .
Let SUCCESS denote the event that $\mathcal{A}$ distin-
guishes $m_{b}$ . Let QUERY denote the event that $\mathcal{A}$
asks a hash query on $\hat{r}$ such that $\hat{r}^{e}=\hat{c}_{1}$ . Then, the
success probability of the experiment is bounded
by
$Pr[SUCCESS]\leq Pr[SUCCESS\wedge$ QUERY $]$
$+Pr[QUERY]$ , (1)
for the random tape of $\mathcal{A}$ and of the experiment.
This equation tums out to be bounded by $\frac{1}{2}+$
$negl(n)$ , from the assumption that $\mathcal{H}$ is the ran-
dom oracle and the RSA assumption holds w.r. $t$ .
the generation algorithm GEN. For a detailed dis-
cussion, we refer the reader to [5]. For now, we
give the reduction construction that succeeds in
inverting a ciphertext $\hat{c}_{1}$ into $r$ , whenever the event
QUERY happens.
The reduction $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}$ on input $(N, e,\hat{c}_{1})$ :
1. Choose $\hat{k}arrow\{0,1\}^{l(n)}$ and run $\mathcal{A}$ on the public
key $(N, e)$ .
2. On every hash query on $r$ from $\mathcal{A}$ , check if
$r^{e}=\hat{c}_{1}mod N$ , then retum $\hat{k}$ . Otherwise, re-
tum a uniformly random $karrow\{0,1\}^{\iota(n)}$ . Keep
a table $T$ with all values $(r_{i},y_{i})$ queried and
answered.
3. Eventually, $\mathcal{A}$ delivers two plaintexts $m_{0}$ and
$m_{1}$ .
4. Pick a uniformly random bit $barrow\{0,1\}$ and
deliver $(\hat{c}_{1}, c_{2})$ to $\mathcal{A}$ , where $c_{2}=\hat{k}\oplus m_{b}$ , while
answering the hash queries as before.
5. At the end of the execution of $\mathcal{A}$ , if there is a
value $r_{i}\in T$ , such that $r_{i}^{e}=\hat{c}_{1}mod N$ , then
output $r_{t}$ .
Notice that $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}$ simulates $\mathcal{H}$ at step 2 and 5 and
it keeps a table T.
Under the assumption that the RSA problem is
hard w.r. $t$ . the algorithm GEN, we have that
$Pr$ [QUERY] $\leq negl(n)$ ,
for the random choices of $N,$ $e,\hat{c}_{1}$ , and the random
tapes of $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}$ and $\mathcal{A}$ .
The previous construction of the reduction $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}$
and the Equation 1 and the definition of the ran-
dom oracle give us the following well known theo-
rem.
Well Known Theorem (IND-CPA Security [5]).
Assume that the $RSA$ problem is hard with re-
spect to the algorithm GEN and that $\mathcal{H}$ is the ran-
dom oracle, then $S$ is indistinguishable under chosen-
plaintext attack.
Fkom now, we apply our model to the proof.
3.2 The Proposed Model with Direct
Access to $\mathcal{H}_{\mathcal{W}Q}$
In order to state the same theorem using the
version of the random oracle with the suggested
watching query, assume that $\mathcal{H}w\mathcal{Q}$ is such an ora-
cle. Then, let $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}}}w\mathcal{Q}(n)$ be a different version of
the previous reduction, in which there is no simu-
lation of the regular random oracle $\mathcal{H}$ , in the sense
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that thc reduction algorithm does not keep any
table of values.
Instead, we allow $A$ to interact with $\mathcal{H}_{\mathcal{W}Q}$ freely,
that is, throughly an arbitrary number of hash
queries. We denote this adversary $\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}wQ}$ . Later,
in Lemma 1, we fully specify the reduction.
Analogous to the well known case, we define the
experiment $Exp_{A^{\mathcal{H}}wQ}^{CPA}(n)$ as follows:
The experiment $Exp_{\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}}}^{CPA}w\mathcal{Q}(n)$:
1. Run GEN $(1^{n})arrow(N, e, d)$ .
2. Pick a uniformly random value $\hat{r}arrow \mathbb{Z}_{N}^{*}$ and
compute $\hat{c}_{1}=\hat{r}^{e}mod N$ .
3. Run $\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}wQ}$ on the public key $(N, e)$ .
4. Eventually, $\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}w\mathcal{Q}}$ delivers two plaintexts $m_{0}$
and $m_{1}$ , pick two uniformly random values $barrow$
$\{0,1\}$ and $\hat{k}arrow \mathcal{H}_{\mathcal{W}Q}(\hat{r})$ , then retum $(\hat{c}_{1},\hat{c}_{2})$
where $\hat{c}_{2}=\hat{k}\oplus m_{b}$ .
5. Thc adversary $\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}w\mathcal{Q}}$ should output the bit $b’$ .
6. If $b=b’$ , output 1. Otherwise $0$ .
The purpose is to show that using the random
oracle $\mathcal{H}_{\mathcal{W}Q}$ , the Equation 1 still holds in the case
of $Exp_{\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}}}^{CPA}w\Omega(n)$ , aiid it also becomes bounded by
$\frac{1}{2}+negl(n)$ . In other words, we want to show that
$Pr[Exp_{\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}}}^{CPA}w\mathcal{Q}(n)=1]\leq Pr[SUCCESS A \overline{QUERY}_{wQ}]$
$+Pr[QUERY_{\mathcal{W}Q}]$
$\leq\frac{1}{2}+negl(n)$ , (2)
for the uniformly random choices of the random
tapes for $\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}w\mathcal{Q}}$ and the events QUERY$\mathcal{W}Q$ , in
which the adversary $\mathcal{A}^{Hw\mathcal{Q}}$ makes an explicit query
on $\hat{r}$ , and the usual SUCCESS event, when the ad-
versary distinguishes the ciphertext successfully.
We rewrite the result in [5] for the random oracle
$\mathcal{H}_{\mathcal{W}Q}$ as follows:
Lemma 1. Assuming that the $RSA$ problem is hard
$w th$ respect to the algorithm GEN and given the
mndom oracle $\mathcal{H}_{\mathcal{W}\mathcal{Q}}$ , with watching query, then
$Pr[QUERY_{wQ}]$ is negligible on the security param-
eter $n$ .
Proof. We construct a reduction $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}}}w\mathcal{Q}$ that is
able to invert an RSA ciphertext $\hat{c}_{1}$ whenever the
event QUERY$\mathcal{W}Q$ occurs.
The reduction $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}}}wQ$ on input $(N, e,\hat{c}_{1})$ :
1. Run $\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}w\mathcal{Q}}$ with the public key $(N, e)$ .
2. Eventually, $\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}w\mathcal{Q}}$ delivers two plaintexts $m_{0}$
and $m_{1}$ .
3. Pick a uniformly random bit $barrow\{0,1\}$ and
deliver $(\hat{c}_{1}, c_{2})$ to $\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}w\mathcal{Q}}$ for a randomly chosen
value
$\overline{k}arrow\{0,1\}^{l(n)}$ and $c_{2}=\tilde{k}\oplus m_{b}$ .
4. At the end of the execution of $\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}w\mathcal{Q}}$ , check if
there exists an indcx $i$ , such that
$\mathcal{W}Q(i)=(r_{i}, y_{i})$ and $r_{i}^{e}=\hat{c}_{1}mod N$ , then
output $r_{i}$ . Otherwise, fail.
Since we know from the $RS$A assumption that
$Pr[\mathcal{A}(N, e,\hat{c}_{1})=\hat{r}|c_{1}^{e}=\hat{r}mod N\wedge(N, e, d)arrow$
GEN $(1^{n})]$ is negl $(n)$ , then $Pr[QUERY_{\mathcal{W}Q}]\leq negl(n)$ ,
where the probability is taken for the uniformly
random choices of $N,$ $e,\hat{c}_{1}$ and the random
$tapes\square$
of $\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}we}$ and $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}}}w\mathcal{Q}$ .
We proceed to prove the first term of the right
side of Equation 2.
Lemma 2. Given the random oracle $\mathcal{H}_{\mathcal{W}\mathcal{Q}}$ that
answers watching quernes, then
Pr[SUCCESS $\wedge\overline{QUERY}_{\mathcal{W}Q}$ ] $\leq\frac{1}{2}$ .
$iS^{roof.- Exp_{\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}}}^{CPA}(n}exac\iota^{Givenaexperiment\tilde{k}_{eriment^{wQ}}}1ythesameasthe\exp Exp_{\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}}wQ}^{C}(n)P\downarrow A^{which}$
with the only exception is that at Step 4, instead
of taking a value $karrow \mathcal{H}wQ(\hat{r})$ , the experiment
takes a value $\tilde{k}arrow\{0,1\}^{l(n)}$ uniformly at ran-
dom. It is easy to see that the success probability
for $\tilde{k}- Exp_{\mathcal{A}^{-wQ}}^{CPA}(n)$ and $Exp_{\mathcal{A}^{?\iota_{w\mathcal{Q}}}}^{CPA}(n)$ are approx-
imately equal as long as QUERY does not happen.
And also that Pr[SUCCESS $\wedge\overline{QUERY}_{\mathcal{W}\mathcal{Q}}$ ] $\leq$
Pr[SUCCESS QUERY$wQ$]. The distribution $\{\tilde{k}\oplus$
$m_{b}\}$ is indistinguishable from the uniform distri-
bution $\mathcal{U}_{l(n)}$ due to the choice of $\tilde{k}$ . Therefore, the
success probability for the experiment depends on
the values provided by the random oracle $\mathcal{H}_{\mathcal{W}Q}$ for
regular, i.e., hash, queries on arbitrary values, and
this also bounds the probability Pr $[$SUCCESS
$|\overline{QUERY}_{\mathcal{W}Q}]\leq\Sigma 1$ due to the uniformly distribu-
tion of the random oracle model. $\square$
Lemmas 1 and 2lead us to the new version of
the IND-CPA security based on the random oracle
$\mathcal{H}_{\mathcal{W}\mathcal{Q}}$ .
Theorem 1. Assume that $RSA\iota s$ hard with re-
spect to the algonthm GEN and that $\mathcal{H}_{\mathcal{W}Q}$ is a
random oracle unth watching query, then $S$ is in-
distinguishable under chosen-plaintext attack.
Proof. Given the experiment $Exp_{\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}_{\mathcal{W}\mathcal{Q}}}}^{CPA}(n)$ , and
sary $\mathcal{A},$ $Pr[Exp_{\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}}}^{CPA}wQ(n)=1]\leq\frac{1}{2}+negl(n)$ .
Lemmas 1 and 2, we have that for any PPT
$adver-\square$
Note that we do not need to provide the reduc-
tions, in Lemma 1 and 2, with access to the setting
query $S\mathcal{Q}$ or even the regular query of $\mathcal{H}wQ$ , as
long as the watching query $WQ$ is available.
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4 Proofs for CCA-secure RSA
Scheme
We continue with a more complex type of attack.
Let, this time, the scheme $S$ be the triple (GEN,
ENC, DEC) as before, however with a differcnt im-
plementation for ENC and DEC algorithms.
The encryption algorithm ENC$(N, e, m)=(r^{e}$
mod $N$ , ENC$\mathcal{H}(r)’(m))$ , for a randomness $rarrow \mathbb{Z}_{N}^{*}$ ,
a message $m\in\{0,1\}^{l(n)}$ and a private-key en-
cryption algorithm $ENC_{(\cdot)}’(\cdot)$ .
The decryption algorithm DEC$(N, d, (c_{1}, c_{2}))=$
$m$ computes $r=c_{1}^{d}mod N$ and $k=\mathcal{H}(r)$ , then
outputs $DEC_{k}’(c_{2})$ for a ciphertext $(c_{1}, c_{2})$ .
First, we review the well known proofs for the
scheme. Then, in the second part, we apply our
model.
4.1 The Well Known IND-CCA Security
Proof [5]
Let $Exp_{\mathcal{A}}^{CCA}(n)$ be the experiment, where the ad-
versary $A$ chooses $m_{0}$ and $m_{1}$ , and can also ask
queries on ciphertexts of its choice to the oracle
DEC$(N,d)(\cdot)$ and $(N, d)$ is the secret key for the
public key received by $\mathcal{A}$ . The adversary wins if it
distinguishes the ciphertext $(r^{e}mod N$ ,
ENC$\mathcal{H}(r)/(m_{b}))$ , for $barrow\{0,1\}$ chosen uniformly at
random.





where the events SUCCESS and QUERY are de-
fined analogous to those of the previous section.
The detailed proof in [5] gives us two constructions
that bound the probability of success for the ex-
periment $Exp_{\mathcal{A}}^{CCA}$ under the assumption that RSA
problem is hard w.r. $t$ . the generation algorithm
GEN and $\mathcal{H}$ is the random oracle. The following
reduction bounds $Pr[SUCCESS\wedge\overline{QUERY}]\leq\frac{1}{2}+$
negl $(n)$ .
The reduction $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1ND}$ has access to DEC$\hat{k}$’ $($ , $)$ for
some unknown $\hat{k}$ :
1. Run $\mathcal{A}(N, e)$ for $(N, e, d)arrow$ GEN $(1^{n})$ and choose
$\hat{c}_{1}=\hat{r}^{e}mod N$ , for $\hat{r}arrow\{0,1\}^{l(n)}$ chosen ran-
domly.
2. Keep a table $T=\{(r_{i}, y_{i})\}$ on the values asked
by $A$ for the random oracle.
3. On every query $(c_{1}, c_{2})hom\mathcal{A}$ , check if $\hat{c}_{1}=$
$c_{1}$ , query DEC$/\hat{k}(c_{2})$ and retum the value to $A$ .
Otherwise, compute $k=\mathcal{H}(r)$ , for $r=c_{1}^{d}$ mod
$N$ , and retum $DEC_{k}’(c_{2})$ to $\mathcal{A}$ .
4. On every query $r$ to the random oracle, check
if there exist a pair $(r, k)\in T$ , retum $k$ . Oth-
erwise, take randomly $karrow\{0,1\}^{l(n)}$ , return it
and store $(r, k)$ in the table T.
5. When receiving $m_{0}$ and $m_{1}$ , from $\mathcal{A}$ , deliver
them to it own experiment and use the re-
ceived ciphertext $\hat{C}2$ by sending $(\hat{c}_{1},\hat{c}_{2})$ to $\mathcal{A}$ .
6. When $\mathcal{A}$ outputs the decision bit $b^{l}$ , output it.
There are two important observations in this
construction.
First, the probability of success of $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1ND}$ is equal
to the probability that $\mathcal{A}$ distinguishes the cipher-
text
$(\hat{c}_{1},\hat{c}_{2})$ . Moreover, both probabilities are bounded
by the indistinguishability property of the scheme
(ENC/, DEC$’$ ), assuming that the event QUERY does
not occur. That is,
Pr[SUCCESS $\wedge\overline{QUERY}$] $\leq\frac{1}{2}+negl(n)$ ,
where the probability is taken over the random
values in the random tapes of $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1ND}$ and $\mathcal{A}$ .
The next reduction shows that the event QUERY
happens with negligible probability, due to the RSA
assumption.
The reduction $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1N\vee}$ on input $(N, e,\hat{c}_{1})$ :
1. Choose $\hat{k}arrow\{0,1\}^{l(n)}$ and initialize the table
$T$ with the triple $(\cdot, c_{1}^{\wedge},\hat{k})$ .
2. On every query $(c_{1}, c_{2})$ :
if there exists $c_{1}\in T$ such that $r^{e}=c_{1}$ mod
$N$ output DEC $\prime k(C_{2})$ for the triple $(*, c_{1},\hat{k})$ or
$(r, c_{1}, k)$ .
Otherwisc, take a random $karrow\{0,1\}^{t(n)}$ re-
tum DEC$k/(c_{2})$ and add $(*, c_{1}, k)$ to T.
3. On every random oracle query $r$ :
If $(r, c_{1}, k)\in T$ , retum $k$ ;
If $(., c_{1}, k)\in T$ , retum $k$ and add $r$ to the
tuple and turn it into $(r, c_{1}, k)\in T$ ; Other-
wise, choose $karrow\{0,1\}^{l(n)}$ , retum $k$ and add
$(r, c_{1}, k)$ to T.
4. Eventually, $\mathcal{A}$ outputs two messages $m_{0}$ and
$m_{1}$ , take a random bit $barrow\{0,1\}$ and set
$\hat{c}_{2}arrow$ ENC$\dot{k}’(m_{b})$ . Retum $(c_{1}^{\wedge},\hat{c}_{2})$ to $A$ , and con-
tinue answering the queries.
5. When $\mathcal{A}$ finishes, if there exists $(\hat{r},\hat{c},\hat{k})\in T$ ,
output $\hat{r}$ .
Whenever $A$ queries on $\hat{r}$ , then $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT} N\vee}$ succeeds
in inverting $C_{1}^{\wedge}$ , and this is negligible under the as-
sumption that RSA is hard w.r. $t$ . GEN. The two
constructions detailed and discussed in [5], lead us
to the following security statement.
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Well Known Theorem (IND-CCA Security [5]).
Assume that $RSA$ is hard vnth respect to GEN, $\mathcal{H}$
is the mndom omcle, and the private-key scheme
used has indistinguishability under a chosen-
ciphenext attack, then the scheme $S$ is a public-
key encryption scheme utth indistinguishable en-
cryptions under a chosen-ciphenext attack.
From now, we apply our model to the proof.
4.2 The Proposed Model with Direct Ac-
cess to $\mathcal{H}wQ$
Once again, we apply our model, using the simi-
lar experiment from the well known proof. We give




for the probabilities taken for the random tapes of
the experiment and the adversary as well as the
outputs of $\mathcal{H}_{\mathcal{W}Q}$ .
We rely on the next two lemmas.
Lemma 3. If the prevate-key scheme $(ENC’$ , DEC$’)$
has indistinguishable encryptions under chosen-
ciphertext attack and $\mathcal{H}_{\mathcal{W}\mathcal{Q}}$ is modeled as a ran-
dom oracle with watching query, then
Pr[SUCCESS $\wedge\overline{Q\cup ERY}_{wQ}$] $\leq\frac{1}{2}+negl(n)$ .
Proof We give a reduction $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}}}^{1ND_{wQ}}$ , which distin-
guishes the ciphertext for the scheme (ENC
$t$ , DEC/)
with probability greater than the probability that
$\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}w\mathcal{Q}}$ distinguishes the ciphertext for $S$ in the
case when the event QUERY $\mathcal{W}\mathcal{Q}$ does not happen.
The reduction $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}}}^{1ND_{w\mathcal{Q}}}$ has access to the or-
acle DEC$/\hat{k}($ . $)$ for some unknown $\hat{k}$ :
1.
$choose\hat{c}_{1}=\hat{r}^{e}mod N,for\hat{r}arrow\{0,1\}^{l(n)}RunA^{\mathcal{H}w\mathcal{Q}}(N,e)for(N, e, d)arrow GEN(1^{n})and$
chosen uniformly at random.
2. On every query on $(c_{1}, c_{2})$ , check if $\hat{c}_{1}=c_{1}$ ,
query DEC$’\dot{k}(c_{2})$ and retum the value to $\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}_{w\mathcal{Q}}}$ .
Otherwise, pick a uniformly random value $\tilde{k}arrow$
$\{0,1\}^{l(n)}$ and return DEC$\frac{/}{k}(c_{2})$ to $\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}wQ}$ .
3. When receiving $m_{0}$ and $m_{1}$ , from $\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}w\mathcal{Q}}$ , de-
liver them to its own experiment and use the
received ciphertext on $\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}w\mathcal{Q}}$ by sending the
adversary the ciphertext $(\hat{c}_{1},\hat{c}_{2})$ .
4. When $\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}wQ}$ outputs the decision bit $b’$ , out-
put it.
Let SUCCESS be the event that $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}_{\mathcal{W}Q}}}^{1ND}$ suc-
cecds in distinguishing the ciphertext in the pre-
vious reduction, then, from the construction, we
known that
Pr[SUCCESS] $\geq Pr[SUCCESS\wedge\overline{QUERY}_{\mathcal{W}\mathcal{Q}}]$ ,
where the probability is taken over the random
tapes of $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}}}^{1ND_{w\mathcal{Q}}}$ and $A^{\mathcal{H}w\mathcal{Q}}$ .
The indistinguishability of the private-key scheme
gives that there is a negligible function on $n$ , such
that Pr[SUCCESS] $\leq\frac{1}{2}+negl(n)$ and this finishes
the proof. $\square$
The next lemma proves that the probability of
a query on $\hat{r}$ , such that $\hat{r}^{e}mod N$ is equal to
the challenge ciphertext, has negligible probability
of happen, and this proves the negl $(n)$ term of
Equation 3.
Lemma 4. If the $RSA$ problem is hard relative to
GEN, and $\mathcal{H}_{\mathcal{W}Q}$ is modeled as a mndom oracle,
then
$Pr$ [$QU$ ERY] is negligible.
Proof. We build a reduction $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}}}^{1N\bigvee_{w\mathcal{Q}}}$ which inverts
the ciphertext $\hat{c}_{1}$ , whenever the adversary $\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}we}$
makes a query on $\hat{r}$ such that $\hat{c}_{1}=\hat{r}’mod N$ to
the random oracle $\mathcal{H}wQ$ .
The reduction $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}^{?e_{w\mathcal{Q}}}}^{1N\vee}$ on input $(N, e,\hat{c}_{1})$ :
1. Run $\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}w\mathcal{Q}}(N, e)$.
2. On every query on $(c_{1}, c_{2})$ , retum DEC$\prime y_{i}(c_{2})$
for
an index $i$ , such that, $\mathcal{H}_{\mathcal{W}\mathcal{Q}}(i)=(r_{i},y_{t})$ and
$c_{1}=r_{i}^{e}mod N$ .
3. When receiving the pair $(m_{0}, m_{1})$ , choose $barrow$
$\{0,1\}$ randomly, set $\hat{c}_{2}arrow$ ENC$’\overline{k}(m_{b})$ for $\tilde{k}arrow$
$\{0,1\}^{l(n)}$ also chosen randomly, and retum $(c_{1}^{\wedge},\hat{c}_{2})$ .
4. After $A^{\mathcal{H}wQ}$ finishes, check if there is an index
$i$ , s.t., $\mathcal{W}Q(i)=(r., y_{i})$ for $\hat{c}_{i}=r_{i}^{e}mod N$ ,
then retum $r_{i}$ . Otherwise, fail.




and under the assumption that RSA is hard w.r. $t$ .
algorithm GEN this probability is negligible on $n$ ,
for the random choices in the tapes of $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}}}^{IN\bigvee_{wQ}}$ ,
$\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}w\mathcal{Q}}$ , and the random values for $N,$ $e$ and $C_{1}^{\wedge}$ .
$\square$
The previous two lemmas lead us to the security
result regarding the IND-CCA secure variant of the
RSA with respect to our model.
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Theorem 2. Assume that $RSA$ is hard with re-
spect to GEN, $\mathcal{H}_{\mathcal{W}Q}$ is modeled as a mndom ora-
$cle$ , and the prevate-key scheme used has indistin-
guishability under a chosen-ciphertext attack, then
the scheme $S$ is a public-key encryption scheme
with indistinguishable encryptions under a chosen-
ciphertext attack
The proof is analogous to the IND-CPA secure
RSA case, therefore we skip it.
5 Analysis
We divide our analysis in two parts. The first
regards our results presented in this work, namely
security of encryption schemes in our model. The
second part is related to our beliefs and issues
not yet fully understood, regarding the security of
other schemes in our model, specifically, signaturc
schemes.
3. J. S. Coron. “On the Exact Security of Full Domain
Hash CRYPTO 2000-Advances in Cryptology,
LNCS vol. 1880/2000, Springer Berlin/Heidelberg,
2000, pp. 229-235.
4. Jesper Buus Nielsen, $\iota$‘Separating Random Ora-
cle Proofs from Complexity Theoretic Proofs: The
Non-commiting Encryption Case,“ Crypto 2002-
Advances in Cryptology.
5. Jonathan Katz and Yehuda Lindell, Introduction
to Modem Cryptography. Chapman and Hall/CRC,
2008.
6. R. Canetti, O. Goldreich, and S. Halevi, “ The
Random Oracle Methodology, Revisited,” J. Assoc.
Comput. Mach. 51, 2004, no. 4, pp. 557-594.
5.1 Encryption Schemes
Our model provides a way of proving the secu-
rity without simulating the random oracle to the
adversary.
In fact, our results suggest that managing thc
table In order to simulate the oracle, may provide
too much power to the reduction, since, at least
for the case of encryption, it is possible to prove
security only by watching the hash queries, instead
of imposing (or setting) values to the outputs.
For the reductions in the proofs for both IND-
CPA and IND-CCA cases, even the access to the
regular hash queries can be removed.
5.2 Signature Schemes
The use of our model to prove the security of
signatures is the natural question that arises. For
the authors, it seems that the setting queries, this
time, maybe needed. It is not clear if the watch-
ing queries in order to prove security for those
schemes. If so, then, we should consider the $\mathcal{H}w\mathcal{Q},S\mathcal{Q}$
oracle. Despite of our beliefs, none of this is clear
and research on the matter may bring new obser-
vations.
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